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OSA exception stores

Store Managers that are OSA exception stores this is for you:
All eyes are on you right now from RVPs. DMs are at risk of being held accountable for their stores having exceptions.
RVPs don't have eyes on pharmacy ATM as it is June. All eyes are on OSA for the FE.
If your store is an exception store for OSA, your DM must hold SM's accountable to avoid themselves being held accountable by the RVP.
If you are not an OSA exception store, you are in the clear.
Avoiding severance and terminating SM's for "performance" is the cost saving method.
More to come next week.


Top-Paid CEOs Smash the $200 Million Payday

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ceo-pay-2025-d2885ea3

[Didn't quote entire article text, just extracted AK's info. from the interactive table in the article].

AK ranks 34th out of 392 CEOs on the list:
Total pay: $38M
Pay Change: +51.1%
1-Year Return: 38%
Median Employee Pay: $49,630

Waiting with bated breath for my 51% raise this year!


Stop worrying about DEI and worry about getting the work done

Centene's single biggest problem is it's leadership...or lack there of. They need to stop worrying about getting the next DEI accolade and do the job. Honestly I don't think they know how and it is time to clean house starting at the very top.
Michael Neidorff is rolling in his grave seeing what his replacement has done to this once thriving company. While he wasn't perfect, this group at the top shouldn't be running a car wash much less a fortune 100 company.
It is time to clean 50% of the directors and above. 100% of the top 10 in charge need to go too. Take 25% of that money saved and use it for the people who actually work. The rest would make up the savings needed to make the company viable again.
The old saying...too many chiefs and not enough Indians is sooooo very true within Centene. Yes, that isn't a politically correct saying. But it fits and Centene needs to STOP worrying about the next DEI trophy and do their damn job being fiscally responsible for the taxpayers money paying for medical benefits!!!


FIG and Dhivya is a mess

  1. She keeps pushing for outside talent that have no idea what we do. Associates and clients just want results not supposed big name! Are we not heavy on top already? You need to keep and bring back former Fiserv talent that know how to keep the lights ON!! That is your path to success. What you are doing shows you do not care and are on your way out!

  2. Bank is too big and ineffective, full of non-doers and we are still losing clients. Too many SVPs with no accountability! Sold nothing, keep moving clients from one Core to another and claim victory

  3. Credit Union - That leader is a no show. Has a bunch of SVPs that again have no idea what Fiserv does and he is bringing in more to do what??!? He needs to just show up and do the job! He and his band of losers are failing forward over and the circus is not stopping

  4. EmFi - does that heavy engine make any money or do anything??

It is going to take Takis too long to figure Dhivya/FIG and these SVPS out. My resume is polished and ready to go. If Fiserv does not care about FIG, why should I any more?!?!?


There are no coincidences!!!

Been trying to stay optimistic since last week's announcement, but reality has set in.
Here are the facts from my purview: layoffs are inevitable if VSP numbers fall short. Months ago, my PL requested a detailed breakdown of every one of my direct report's duties, along with a performance ranking completely outside our normal review cycle.
There are no coincidences.
Leadership kept this VSP rollout strictly need-to-know at the very top. As a PL, I was left completely in the dark, though looking back, I can admit I ignored the signs.


When Software Stocks Fly and OpenText Chooses the Basement

Another beautiful day in the market: software companies are flying, AI names are glowing, cloud stocks are breathing fire and OpenText is politely digging downward like it has a strategic partnership with gravity.

At this point, the stock chart looks less like a technology company and more like a management performance review written by shareholders. Everyone else is selling future growth, AI excitement, and cloud confidence. OpenText is selling adjusted EBITDA, restructuring vocabulary, and the spiritual experience of watching ten years disappear from a portfolio.

But don’t worry. I’m sure another leadership memo will arrive soon explaining how this is all part of a bold transformation journey. Because apparently, when the stock falls while the sector rises, that’s not failure, that’s unlocking long-term value very, very slowly.

When other software companies are being rewarded for cloud, AI, cybersecurity, and recurring revenue, OpenText is somehow managing to look like a company that brought a fax machine to an AI conference. OTEX is around $20.65 USD today, with the stock still weak despite reporting Q3 FY2026 revenue of about $1.28B and cloud revenue growth of 6.6% year over year.


Senior leaders to blame…..

As we approach the midway point in 2026, nervousness is starting to set in for several employees in sales.

The narrative across the company is “We are not hitting our numbers.” Remember the numbers we are not hitting are those numbers set by the senior leaders. Senior leaders have far too often set unrealistic goals. The truth is our senior leaders should have seen the trends and adapted to them earlier but here we are sitting on the edge of our seats.

It’s time to rid the company of those individuals in sales that don’t speak with directly with customers. Running a branch of employees that only come on one or two days a week is not needed.

The days of clicking a button and watching the numbers grow are over.


MW approval down to 54% on Glassdoor

That's pretty pathetic. How can you be an effective leader of a massive corporation like Chevron when half the employees no longer respect you. Even DW at XOM has a higher approval rating.

Nearly every performance metric and benchmark set by the Board has declined during his tenure. It's long past time that MW retires and stop running a once great company into the ground.


DXC - a company in decline

Here’s the full picture. The data is sobering.


## DXC Technology: Market Analysis

### Stock Price — 5-Year Collapse

The trajectory is consistent destruction of value: from a 2018 average of ~$80 (peak $93), the stock fell 35% that year, another 28% in 2019, another 30% in 2020. A brief recovery of 25% in 2021 was the last positive year.

From there: -17.7% in 2022, -13.7% in 2023. Into 2024 it was trading around $22–23. The 52-week high was $16.45 in July 2025 — already half of where it was in 2023. The 52-week low hit $7.90 in May 2026. YTD return as of mid-2026: -43.89%.

From $93 peak to ~$8–9 today. That is roughly a 90% destruction of equity value over 8 years.

The consensus from 8 analysts is “Hold.” Average price target: $11.43. BMO Capital lowered its target to $10 from $17, keeping Market Perform. Nobody is bullish. “Hold” at $8–9 is essentially “we don’t know how much further this falls.”


### Revenue — Uninterrupted Decline

Annual revenue of approximately $13.7 billion in FY2024, a decline of over two billion dollars from FY2022.

FY2025 came in at $12.87 billion, down 5.82%. Revenue in the last twelve months (to December 2025) is $12.68 billion, down 3.09% year-over-year.

The most recent quarter: Q4 FY2026 total revenue of $3.13 billion, down 1.2% year-over-year on a reported basis — but down 6.6% on an organic basis. The nominal improvement in reported numbers is forex noise, not operational recovery.

The full organic picture over FY2025: Q1: -4.4%, Q2: -5.6%, Q3: -4.2%, Q4: -4.2%. Full year organic decline: -4.6%. The GIS segment is worse: GIS organic revenue growth across FY2025 was Q1: -9.3%, Q2: -9.6%, Q3: -7.8%, Q4: -6.0% — full year -8.2%.

This is not a one-quarter blip. It is a structural, multi-year revenue haemorrhage.


### “No New Business” — The Book-to-Bill Problem

This is the core issue you’ve identified. In Q1 FY2025, the book-to-bill ratio was 0.77x — compared to 0.89x in Q1 FY2024. A book-to-bill below 1.0 means the company is booking less revenue than it is recognising — i.e., the backlog is shrinking. Consistently below 1.0 is a company consuming itself.

Q2 FY2025 overall book-to-bill: 0.90x. GIS specifically: 0.71x. GIS — their largest segment — was winning less than 71 cents of new work for every dollar of revenue recognised. That is accelerated decline built into future numbers.

The more recent figures look marginally better: Q2 FY2026 trailing twelve-month book-to-bill: 1.15x, with GIS at 1.08x on TTM basis. But context matters — Q4 FY2026 bookings gave a book-to-bill of 1.07x , and organic revenue still fell 6.6% that quarter. Booking more doesn’t reverse the run-off from long-term contracts signed years ago that are now expiring or being reduced.

DXC has made zero acquisitions since November 2019. Over the last five years, the average number of acquisitions per year is zero. There is no inorganic growth play. They are entirely dependent on winning organic new business — which they have been structurally failing to do for years.


### Profitability and Cash — The Complicating Factor

DXC is not going to zero next quarter. Full fiscal year 2026 free cash flow was $713 million, up 3.8% year-over-year. The company repurchased $250 million of shares in FY2026.

Gross margin remained relatively stable at 24.09%, and adjusted EBIT margins are being maintained.

But: GAAP EBIT in Q4 FY2026 was negative — $(39) million, a margin of -1.2%. The gap between non-GAAP “adjusted” figures and GAAP reality has been persistently large due to restructuring charges, amortisation, and pension adjustments. The company has been in near-permanent “restructuring” mode for years.

ROIC is below WACC. The company is destroying economic value — it is worth less each year as an operating entity than the capital tied up in it.


### Can It Survive?

Survival as a listed independent company: questionable beyond 3–5 years without a revenue inflection that has not yet materialised.

The structural problem is this: DXC is a legacy IT outsourcer. Its model — large long-term managed services contracts, rates × hours pricing — is being eroded by cloud migration (clients bring workloads in-house or to hyperscalers), offshore competition (TCS, Infosys, Wipro at lower cost), and now AI automation eating into the billable hour. The CEO acknowledges this directly: “The era of rates times hours is ending.” True. The question is whether DXC can pivot to something else before the existing base runs off.

FY2027 guidance anticipates further revenue decline but margin stability, with AI-driven offerings cited as future support. Every IT services company is saying the same thing about AI. DXC is late to that narrative and has no obvious differentiation.

The most likely exit is acquisition. There have been renewed reports of private equity interest, and in late 2022 a Baring Private Equity Asia takeover was rumoured but fell through. At ~$4.1 billion market cap generating $700M+ of free cash flow annually, the FCF yield is enormous — it is obviously a PE target. The asset would be stripped, carved up, and the cash flow harvested while the workforce is cut.

A shareholder lawsuit investigation was launched in June 2026 , which adds legal distraction at a strategically vulnerable moment.


### Summary Assessment

Dimension Verdict
Stock price (5-year) -90% from peak, -44% YTD 2026
Revenue trend Organic decline ~4–9% every year since FY2020
New business Book-to-bill mostly <1.0 for years; recent marginal improvement
Inorganic growth Zero acquisitions since 2019
Cash generation Strong (~$700M FCF) — the one positive
Economic value creation Negative — ROIC below WACC
Competitive position Structural moat deterioration, no durable advantage
Survival as independent Uncertain — more likely PE acquisition than organic recovery

The cash generation is real and buys time. It also makes the company attractive to a buyer who can cut costs more aggressively than management has been willing to. The narrative around AI and “Xponential AI” and “OASIS” is exactly what a company in distress says. What matters is whether bookings translate into arrested revenue decline — and the gap between book-to-bill improving and organic revenue still falling 6.6% in Q4 FY2026 tells you there is a significant lag at best, a structural impossibility at worst.

The company is not dying this year. It is in managed, prolonged decline, and the probability of meaningful independent recovery is low.

Confidence: High on the factual picture; moderate on the 3–5 year outcome (acquisition vs. slow suffocation are both plausible; a genuine revenue turnaround is the low-probability scenario).


Investor Day and SV presentation

Did you guys see SV’s presentation? He has figured out that physical AI technology of RemainCo is going to change the world and shoot this company to the top. Much as his career has taken off in last 30 years with only PowerPoint slides, without ever getting his hands dirty with any tech project.
Also with UOP taking over HPS management, it’s star is going to shine. Two years ago UOP took over Solstice AM management just for four months before they spun it out and the latter’s stock price has doubled in just 6 months.


When Performance Expectations Become a Moving Target

After over a decade in corporate banking, I’ve realized that one of the most frustrating things about modern corporate culture is when performance expectations become increasingly subjective.

It’s one thing to be measured on clear outcomes, production, quality, deadlines, or objective standards. It’s another to be told you need more “critical thinking,” more “ownership,” more “judgment,” or more “independence” without clear definitions of what success actually looks like.

What I’ve experienced is a shift away from structured work and toward ambiguity. Employees are expected to make decisions with incomplete information, navigate constantly changing expectations, and somehow know exactly what leaders want even when the target keeps moving.

The irony is that the people doing the work are often asking for clarity because they genuinely want to succeed. Instead, they can be labeled as needing too much guidance or not being independent enough.

At some point, organizations have to ask themselves whether they are creating environments where people can succeed or environments where expectations are so subjective that almost anyone can be told they aren’t meeting them.

I’ve always believed that if someone knows what success looks like, most people will work hard to achieve it. The challenge is when success becomes a moving target.

Maybe it’s not that employees don’t want to perform. Maybe they’re exhausted from trying to hit goals that are difficult to define in the first place.


Anyone negotiate a successful off-cycle raise?

Looking to hear data from actual employees about on-cycle and off-cycle raises? Meaning, has anyone ever negotiated a raise that didn’t coincide with the early December salary treatment supervisor discussion? I’m interested in hearing if you brought a competing offer to the table? What % raise did you ask for? Did you receive it? What time of year? Also interested to hear if anyone negotiated a higher raise % “on-cycle” meaning you did it at the early December salary treatment discussion. Any insights welcome.


What's it like at Dell Federal these days?

Dell Federal was always the darling (along with Global). Federal had their own building annex next to building 3 when I was there (for -security- and their red outlined badges to easily identify them as part of the elite Fed team). They had the most lifers and boomers @ Dell. Many ex-military. Life couldn't get better at Dell if you were in Dell Federal Sales. Do they still reign supreme with their easy Government appropriations and special blanket purchase agreements worth billions of dollars... most of the mega easy commissions checks cut by Dell were for Federal AEs, ISRs, SEs and ISG/CSG TSRs. Hope they are still doing well and raking in the cash.


We are back baby!

Down another 50% in last year, now back to 2017 pricing. Tragicomic Q3 results puts this abject clownshow near 130 by EOD.

When your "operating model" is to find the most enthusiastically incompetent, dishonest, lazy "leaders" available and give them absolute control over sales, marketing, and service delivery...


Elliott and friends

How you’ve found value by just restructuring the company is amazing. But how you will continue to post growth at this circling the drain is beyond even the most experienced insiders when we know this growth is financially engineered. This is a slow motion train wreck and if you don’t take the GE people out of this picture, you will also lose value. It takes consistent incompetence and grifting to destroy something with this much history and momentum and you guys have showed up late to the party.


Scribe Optimize - New AI Tracking

Just heard that “Scribe Optimize” (a third party AI company) is going to be implemented across a few teams. Being sold as a way to optimize how long it takes to do tasks by tracking each employee on how long it takes them to do something and if they’re faster, then to teach others how they did it faster.

Soooo definitely just a new way to track employees and lay more folks off.